Abstract We present an oblivious transfer (OT) protocol that combines the OT scheme of Chou and Orlandi [5] together with the supersingular isogeny Diffie-Hellman (SIDH) primitive of De Feo, Jao, and Plût [15] . Our construction is a candidate for post-quantum secure OT and demonstrates that SIDH naturally supports OT functionality. We consider the protocol in the simplest configuration of -OT and analyze the protocol to verify its security.
Introduction
Most, if not all, of cryptography can be based on the notion of Oblivious Transfer (OT), under the assumption that an efficient such scheme is available. Efficient OT protocols are known in a quantum-susceptible scenario [5] 4 , where the underlying security assumption is the hardness of computing discrete logarithms or factoring integers. Additionally, many papers have introduced OT in the context of quantum cryptography [2, 8, 9, 23, 24, 33, 38] , where the legitimate users manipulate quantum states. The post-quantum OT research has gradually increased over time. Thus, one of the other examples that could be cited is the work done by Kazmi [21] .
In general, in an OT protocol, the sender wants to transfer one of possibly many pieces of information to a receiver, giving the receiver the choice of which information is transferred while remaining oblivious as to what information has been transferred. For instance, a sender sends two messages, say m a and m b , and the receiver chooses only one of them (for instance, the receiver chooses m a ). At the end of the protocol, the sender does not know which of the messages was chosen, and also the receiver learns nothing about the other message (in this case, m b ). Most actual OT proposals use a hybrid protocol similar to hybrid encryption in the public-key cryptography setting, in that a public-key cryptosystem, in practice, is needed only to bootstrap the initial transmission of a small piece of data.
This paper is organized as follows. In the section 2 describes our supersingular isogeny oblivious transfer (SIOT) proposal. Moreover, in Section 3 we discuss some analysis about security aspects from SIOT and finally we conclude this work in section 4. It should be noted that in appendix A, we introduce some crucial background used in this paper such as elliptic curve, torsion points, isogenies, distorsion map, modified Weil pairing and a basic concept of OT. In appendix B we show some definitions about the process that determines linearly independent points used by proposed protocol. Furthermore, In appendix C, we see a simplified form of the OT protocol from [5] . In appendix D, there is the possibility of applying a symmetric pairing in the security analysis of the SIOT protocol. Finally, in appendix E we will verify that the proposed protocol is able to share certain points that allow to execute the OT functionality.
Our contribuition. According to Hazay and Lindell [18] , OT is one of the most important building blocks in cryptography and advantageous for constructing secure protocols. In addition, protocols with OT characteristics can be used in electronic auction environments and contract signing [13] . Thus, we implemented the OT functionality in the established SIDH protocol from [15] , providing greater privacy between sender and recipient on a communication channel. Our main aim is to develop a post-quantum OT protocol to achieve quantum resistance.
The
2 1
-SIOT protocol
In this section, we will see a new scheme called Supersingular Isogeny Oblivious Transfer (SIOT) protocol. It is fundamentally inspired on schemes from [5] and [15] .
Notations
We use the cryptographic primitives of the Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Protocol (SIDH) from [15] . In this way, the following notations below will be used.
i. p → A prime such that p = 3 mod 4; ii. F p 2 → A quadratic extension of F p , where F p 2 = F p [i]/ i 2 + 1 ; iii. E 0 (F p 2 ) → A supersingular elliptic curve over F p 2 ; iv. Z/ Z → A field of integers modulo , where is prime and p; v. P A , Q A → Points over the supersingular elliptic curve E A (F p 2 ); vi. P B , Q B → Points over the supersingular elliptic curve E B (F p 2 ); vii. φ A , φ B → Isogenies between E 0 and E A , E 0 and E B , respectively; viii. φ A , φ B → Isogenies between E B and E BA , E A and E AB , respectively; ix. G A , H A → Images of P B and Q B under Alice's private isogeny φ A ; x. G B , H B → Images of P A and Q A under Bob's private isogeny φ B ; xi. j(E AB ) → j − invariant of supersingular elliptic curve E AB ; xii. r A , r B → Points from Z/ A Z and Z/ B Z , respectively; B ] are generated by kernel P A , Q A and P B , Q B , respectively. Finally, the appendix B presents some definitions used to compute such linearly dependent points. Before describing the proposed protocol, let's consider some premises in the next section.
Premises
As usual let us call "Alice" the sender and "Bob" the receiver, from now on.
1. M be a set of all plaintexts with binary strings of fixed length and (x 0 , x 1 ) ∈ M; 2. C be a set of all ciphertexts with binary strings of fixed length and (c 0 , c 1 ) ∈ C; 3. Enc(j; x) denote a symmetric encryption scheme taking a shared symmetric key j (presumably the j-invariant of some shared supersingular elliptic curve) and a plaintext x; 4. Alice wants to send Bob two messages x 0 , x 1 of her choice. Bob gets to choose one of them, but does not want Alice to know his choice; 5. Alice and Bob use a secure coin-flipping protocol to agree on a uniformly random bit string w that is unique for each session (this ensures that neither Alice not Bob can guess beforehand or control the value of w). This can be achieved with e.g. Wagner's bit commitment protocol [35]; 6. They also agree on a generic scheme to encode w as a pair of points
A ] using the agreed upon deterministic technique. 5 Suppose A and B are small primes, and f is a cofactor such that p is prime. In SIDH protocol, the primes allow the curve to have smooth order so that the isogenies can be computed quickly. See [27] that reports a deep research about the choice of SIDH-Friendly Primes. 6 For more details about this type of representation, see [19] . 7 Since the discrete logarithm problem is easy (even classically) in the relevant elliptic groups, a sensible method to attain this is to simply hash w to the coefficients of the 2.2.3 Abstract view of information exchange from
then abort. -SIOT protocol.
chosen elliptic group basis (rather than resorting to, say, the scheme of Shallue and van de Woestijne [29] 
. If so, he accepts the received public key. Otherwise, the public key is refused. 
A ] under his secret isogeny φ B . Moreover, notice also that
A ] then, they can be written as a linear combination, i.e, U = αG B + βH B and V = γG B + δH B for unique α, β, γ, δ ∈ Z/ e A A Z. In the implementation of the proposed protocol, a priori, we are not worried about implementing a subprotocol originating from [29] 
2.2.5.2 Setup -Receiver
2.2.6 Encryption and Decryption
1.
Alice encrypts c i ← Enc(j i , x i ) such that i ∈ {0, 1} and sends to Bob c = (c 0 , c 1 ); 2. Bob decrypts and gets
Remark 2.2.6.1. From equations (1) and (2) above, it is verified that a key
. Hence, at the end of the protocol if both parts are honest then we have that j b = j i . Therefore, we can conclude that if the Bob chooses a unique b, then it will share a unique secret key with Alice.
3 Analysis of the SIOT protocol
Supersingular Isogeny Problems
In this section, we will see some cases of computational problems from supersingular elliptic curves that were adapted by [15] . Such problems reinforce the security of the proposed protocol. Therefore, let a supersingular curve E 0 over F p 2 together with independent bases {P A , Q A } and {P B , Q B } of E 0 [ 
In this case, we could suppose that given only a public key (E A , φ A (P B ), φ A (Q B )) then, we won't be to able to determine any value from kernel because we don't know the corresponding private key (φ A , r A ).
In this case, we could assume that given only the two public keys (E A , G A , H A ) and (E B , G B , H B ) and not knowing any of their respective private keys (φ A , r A ) and (φ B , r B ) then, it will be impracticable to compute the value of a j − invariant.
In the next sections, we will present some notations and definitions for security analysis of proposed protocol. After that, we will check some minimal requirements that are important to make such protocol secure.
Notations
In our analysis of the proposed protocol, the following notations below will be used.
where parameters E A , G A , H A and r B are denoted in section 2.1; ii. The view of Alice in an execution, for a two-party protocol with parties Sender (Alice) and Receiver (Bob) → {V IEW Alice (Alice(1 n , τ ), Bob(1 n , b))}, where Alice has input τ , Bob has input b, and the security parameter is 1 n ;
Remark 3.2.0.1. Similarly, we denote the view of Bob by {V IEW Bob (Alice(1 n , τ ),
iii. Both Alice and Bob dishonest → Alice * , Bob * , respectively.
Preliminaries
Definition 3.3.0.1. A function (·) is negligible in n, or just negligible, if for every positive polynomial p(·) and all sufficiently large ns it holds that (·) < 1/p(·).
Remark 3.3.0.1. For example, the functions 2 − √ n and n − log 2 n are negligible as function in n. For more details, see [17] . Definition 3.3.0.2. A probability ensemble X = {X (n, a)} is an infinite sequence of random variables indexed by n ∈ N and a ∈ {0, 1} * . The value n will represent the security parameter and a will represent the parties' inputs. Definition 3.3.0.3. Two distribution ensembles X = {X (n, a)} and Y = {Y(n, a)} are said to be computationally indistinguishable, denoted by X c ≡ Y, if for every non-uniform polynomial-time algorithm D there exists a negligible function (·) such that for every n ∈ N and a ∈ {0, 1} * ,
Remark 3.3.0.2. All parties are assumed to run in time that is polynomial in the security parameter which value 1 n is written.
Some analysis requirements
A priori, secure protocols should resist any adversarial attack. Even, Goldreich and Lempel [13] developed a form 2 1 -OT to build protocols for secure multiparty computation. Thus, in order to formally prove that a protocol is secure, say an OT protocol, Hazay and Lindell [18] mentions some required properties such as privacy, correctness, independence of inputs, guaranteed output delivery and fairness. Evidently, such list does not constitute a rigorous definition of security, but rather a set of requirements that should hold for any secure protocol. Moreover, they also state that the two most important requirements in any secure computing protocol are privacy and correctness. Thus, we will see below these requirements for the security analysis of the protocol proposed in this work.
Correctness
Each party should have a guarantee that the output he or she receives from the protocol is correct . We assume that both parties, say Alice and Bob, should be honests, then it will be possible to compute a shared secret in the end of protocol. In other words, only one of two messages (x 0 or x 1 ) should be decrypted, say, x b ← Enc −1 (j b , c b ) without loss of generality. Therefore, it should be true that j(E BAi ) = j(E AB ), i.e, a j − invariant computed by Alice will be exactly the same as that computed by Bob. In figure 2 , the pseudocode shows that this holds, since if the value b, secretly chosen by Bob, is equal to the value i from Alice then, there will be a secret value shared between Alice and Bob. Otherwise, there will be no shared secret.
Privacy
Informally speaking, each party should only learn its intended output from the protocol and nothing else. In the protocol, the choices of Bob shouldn't be known to Alice. At the end of the protocol, Bob can't get any knowledge about the message that he did not decrypt. Formally, we shall see below a suitable and analogous definition from Hazay and Lindell [18] applied to the proposed protocol. i. Non-triviality: If Alice and Bob follow the protocol then after an execution in which Alice has for input any x 0 , x 1 ∈ M 9 and Bob has input bit b ∈ {0, 1}, the output of Bob is x b . In other words, Bob receives pk A and the pair (c 0 , c 1 ) from Alice. Recalling that pk A ← (E A , G A , H A ) and c b ← Enc(j b , x b ) are well defined. Thus, non-triviality follows from the fact that
Vélu s f ormula{ G
Therefore, x b ← Enc −1 (j AB , c b ) such that j AB = j b and b is an unique value secretly chosen by Bob. Remark 3.4.2.1. Upon receiving pk A , say Alice's public key, Bob will not be able to compute her private key, say (φ A , r A ). If that could be possible, there would be a violation of the CSSI problem (problem 2).
ii. Privacy in the case of a dishonest Alice: Note that this requirement is that Alice's view when Bob has input 0 is indistinguishable from its view when Bob has input 1. In other words, the view of a supposed adversarial, say Alice, consists merely of public keypk B . Hence, recalling figure 1, we can see that:
Lemma 1. Alice on inputpk B cannot guess b with probability greater than 1/2 + (n), for some negligible function (n) and ∀ n ∈ N Proof. We can assume that on receivingpk B and not knowing the value of Bob's bit b, Alice cannot distinguish the pairs of tuples
] which is independent of b . Thus, this case is similar to the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption. Hence, analogously considering such assumption, we have that:
Now, assume by contradiction that there exists a probabilistic polynomialtime distinguisher 11 D and a non-negligible function such that for every n
where
A ]. Then, by subtracting and adding
We have
Thus, by the contradicting assumption,
Let that (4.1) holds. Thus, we can construct a distinguisherD for the DDH assumption that works as follow. Upon inputpk B = {(E B ,G B ,H B )}, the
A ]. 11 Informally, a distinguisher is an algorithm that describes an adversary's advantage.
In addition, [28] explains that a distinguisher is just an algorithm, possibly a probabilistic one, equipped with way to interact with its environment. 12 LetGB = (GB − R) andHB = (HB − S), where R, S ∈ EB[ A ] and could also be randomly chosen byD, say U and V . Thus, we have thatpk B = {(E B , G B , H B )} and
in contradiction to the DDH assumption. An analogous analysis follows in the case where (4.2) holds. The proof of Bob's privacy is concluded by noting that {(E B , G B , H B )}, {(E B ,G B ,H B )}, regardless of the value of b, are indistinguishable in Alice's view. In other words, let τ ∈ {0, 1} * be an auxiliary input. Thus,
Therefore, the privacy of Bob follows from analogous DDH assumption over the elliptic group E B [
iii. Privacy in the case of a dishonest Bob:
Moreover, the Alice's public key, say pk A := (E A , G A , H A ), sent to Bob and an unique j − invariant j b = j(Vélu s f ormula{ G A + r B H A , E A }) computed by him upon receiving pk A are well defined. After that, ∀ i ∈ {0, 1}, Alice will compute j i = j(Vélu s f ormula{ (Ĝ B + iU ) + r A (Ĥ B + iV ) , E B }), i.e, j 0 and j 1 . In addition, recalling the correctness requirement from subsection 3.4.1, Alice will share an unique secret key with Bob. Therefore, the Alice's privacy is based on the following lemma:
Lemma 2. Bob can't compute two j − invariants j 0 and j 1 (j 0 = j 1 ) whether SSCDH problem is hard.
Proof. If Bob could compute j 0 and j 1 then it would be a violation of the SSCDH problem (problem 3). In other words, Bob will be able to compute just an unique j − invariant, depending on the chosen value of b.
Complementing the lemma proof above, let b ∈ {0, 1} be an auxiliary input and every triple of inputs x 0 , x 1 , x ∈ M 13 . Thus, another way to view the Alice's privacy is that Bob's first message, denoted by Bob* (1 n , b), determines whether it should receive x 0 or x 1 . For example, if it determines that 13 Recall M be the set of all plaintexts with binary strings of fixed length.
it should receive x 0 , then its view when Alice's input is (x 0 , x 1 ) is indistinguishable from its view when Alice's input is (x 0 , x). Evidently, this implies that Bob cannot learn anything about x 1 when it receives x 0 and vice versa. Hence,
After analyzing all the requirements from definition 3.4.2.1 on the SIOT protocol and recalling p be a prime of the form defined on section 2.2.1, we can formulate the following theorem, Theorem 3.4.1. Assume that an analogous decisional Diffe-Hellman (DDH) assumption and a Supersingular Computational Diffe-Hellman (SSCDH) problem are hard in an elliptic group E(F p 2 ). Then, SIOT protocol is a private oblivious transfer as in definition 3.4.2.1.
Further distinguisher and other analyzes
So far, we have demonstrated that SIOT protocol guarantees privacy between sender (Alice) and receiver (Bob). In addition, it should be recalled that the proposed protocol is based on the arithmetic of supersingular elliptic curves from [15] , i.e, the structure of The SIOT protocol inherits the security features from SIDH protocol. However, we still consider it necessary to analyze the security of SIOT protocol. Thus, considering the case of a dishonest Alice, she will use a pairing-based distinguisher for trying to find out the secret value b from honest Bob. In the second situation, the roles will be inverted, i.e, Alice will be considered an honest sender and Bob a dishonest receiver. In the latter case, an analysis is performed in such a way that some algebraic conditions must be obeyed so that Bob is not able to decipher both Alice's messages.
Preventing a pairing-based distinguisher from a possible Alice's dishonesty
Considering the situation where Alice (the dishonest sender) receiving the information (E B ,Ĝ B ,Ĥ B ) from Bob, a priori, does not know whether to receive (E B , G B , H B ) or (E B , G B − U, H B − V ). Alice might consider using the Weil pairing to distinguish between these two values.
In what follows, all pairings have order = e ((1 + λα) 
hence it is necessary that (1+λα)(1+λδ)−λ 2 βγ = 1 (mod
A ). This must hold for any choice of λ, in particular those that are invertible mod e A A , and hence it must hold that λ(αδ − βγ) = −(α + δ) (mod A ). Therefore, in principle, such conditions should be obeyed to avoid Alice finds out Bob's choice.
Possible decryptions from a possible Bob's dishonesty
Recalling
A ] be linearly independent points, and write U = αG B + βH B , V = γG B + δH B . Suppose Alice receives an information (E B ,Ĝ B , H B ) from Bob. Then, Alice will compute actually the degreee A A isogeny φ A0 : E B → E BA0 whose kernel is ker(φ A0 ) = G B + r A H B and φ A1 : E B → E AB1 whose kernel is ker(φ A1 ) = (G B + U ) + r A (H B + V ) . It should be noted 15 that if ker(φ A0 ) ker(φ A1 ) then, E BA0 is isomorphic to E BA1 i.e., E BA0 ∼ = E BA1 . Moreover, if φ A1 is separable then there is a unique isogenyφ A : Therefore, it is important that this equation has no solution because, otherwise, if Alice and Bob cannot control the coefficients α, β, γ, δ apart from ensuring conditions as above, Bob could be able to decrypt both messages from Alice.
Summing up the conditions
In this section we will consider the three conditions on α, β, γ, and δ based on the equations obtained in sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 to ensure SIOT protocol security in a scenario where Alice and Bob are dishonest parties. Thus, conditions on α, β, γ, and δ are obtained that guarantee that Alice will not be able to get the secret choice of Bob's bit b and he will not be able to decipher both pairs c 0 and c 1 sent by Alice. Combining these relations yields γ = −α 2 /β (mod Additionally, in the appendix D we will see the application of a symmetric pairing to analyze other possible conditions relative to the coefficients of the points U and V . Moreover, the appendix E shows the process of sharing of these last points.
Conclusion
We introduce a hybrid protocol called SIOT using a post-quantum protocol called SIDH, whose security is based on the difficulty of an adversary to compute isogenies between supersingular elliptic curves, and an OT protocol whose security feature is based on the privacy between a sender and receiver on a communication channel. For the security analysis of the proposed protocol, an evaluation of the correctness and privacy properties based on the DDH problem was performed, considering a supposed scenario with a dishonest sender and an honest receiver and vice versa. Thus, this analysis verified the guarantee of privacy between the parties involved in the communication channel. In addition, considering the same scenario mentioned above, an algebraic analysis was performed using Weil pairing. This analysis formulated some necessary conditions for choosing the values of the coefficients α, β, δ and γ such that both sender and receiver cannot violate the security of the proposed protocol. It should be noted that the SIOT protocol inherits the conjectures of the isogenies computational problems from SIDH protocol. Finally, it was also considered the possibility of applying symmetric pairing in the security analysis of SIOT protocol taking into account also conditions in choosing the values of the coefficients mentioned above. 
A The Basic Theory
Throughout this appendix, unless otherwise noted, we are going to use the following notation:
-F p → A finite Field, where p 3 be a prime;
The set of pairs (x, y) satisfying the Weierstrass equation of E where x and y are taken in F p orF p , respectively; -#E → Cardinality of the E group, i.e, the number of elements in an elliptic group ; -φ or ψ → An algebraic map between E andẼ and ; -O E → A point at infinity on a curve E.
A.1 Elliptic Curves
Let p 3 be a prime. An elliptic curve E over F p , i.e, E(F p ), is an equation of the form E(F p ) : y 2 = x 3 + Ax + B with A, B ∈ F p satisfying = 4A 3 + 27B 2 = 0. Equations of this type are called Weierstrass equations. The set of points on E with coordinates in F p is the set E(F p ) = {(x, y) : x, y ∈ F p satisfy y 2 = x 3 + Ax + B} ∪ {O} 16 . The points of an elliptic curve E has addition properties 17 and hence, form an Abelian Group. The quantity is called discriminant and there is a quantity j called j − invariant of a Weierstrass equations defined by j = −1728(4A) 3 / . There are other types of elliptic curves such as Montgomery Form (By 2 = x 3 + Ax 2 + x) and Edwards Form (x 2 +ȳ 2 = 1 + dx 2ȳ2 ). These special forms are well suited for certain computations and many authors have used them to improve the efficiency of diverse cryptographic applications 18 . Despite the recognized importance of these special curves, this work is focused on Weierstrass equation for the introduction of the concept of SIOT protocol. Lastly, for more details about all types of elliptic curves applied in cryptograph, see [16] . 16 The point O is a special point located "at infinity". It acts like zero for elliptic curve addition on finite field prime. 17 See theorem 6.5 from [19] . 18 See, for instance, [4, 7, 10, 15, 22, 37] A.
Points of finite order
The concept of points of finite order is important for a later and better understanding about the concept of kernels in the isogeny of elliptic curves. Thus, according to [19] let ≥ 1 be an integer and E be an elliptic curve over F p . A point P ∈ E(F p ) satisfying the identity 19 P = O is called a point of order or -torsion point in the group E(F p ). The set of -torsion points is denoted by
If is prime then, E[ ] can be view as a 2-dimensional vector space over the field Z/ Z,i.e., given points P, Q, R ∈ E[ ] then, we can write a linear combination P = αQ + βR for unique α, β ∈ Z/ Z.
A.1.2 Supersingular elliptic curve
As our proposed protocol is based on [15] , now we are going to see some concepts to supersingular elliptic curves. According to [36] 
In other words, there are no points of order p, even with coordinates in an algebraically closed field. Thus, let p 3 be prime then, the elliptic curve E : y 2 = x 3 + x over F p is supersingular if and only if p = 3 mod 4. Moreover, the theorem 9.11.2 from [16] lists other properties that satisfy a supersingular elliptic curve over F p . On the other hand, if a given elliptic curve does not satisfy any of the conditions in this theorem then this elliptic curve is called ordinary. Supersingular curves can be defined over F p or F p 2 . The field with p 2 elements resembles F p 2 = {a + bi : a, b ∈ F p }, where i satisfies i 2 = −1. For more details, see [19, 30] .
A.1.3 The Weil pairing
The Weil pairing has notorious applications to cryptography, for instance [3, 20, 25] . Now we recall some concepts and properties of this type of pairing that will be important to understand later its use in the security analysis of the protocol proposed in this work.
Definition A.1. The Weil pairing e takes as input a pair of points P, Q ∈ E[ ] and gives as output an th root of unity e (P, Q). In addition, e has the followings properties:
i. The values of the Weil pairing satisfy e (P, Q) = 1 for all P, Q ∈ E[ ]; ii. The Weil pairing is bilinear then e (P, Q A + Q B ) = e (P, Q A )e (P, Q B ) for all P, Q A , Q B ∈ E[ ] and e (P A + P B , Q) = e (P A , Q)e (P B , Q) for all
iii. The Weil pairing is alternating, which means that e (P, P ) = 1 for all P ∈ E[ ]. This implies that e (P, Q) = e (Q, P ) −1 for all P, Q ∈ E[ ]. In addition, if e (P, Q) = e (Q, P ) then, the pairing is symmetric; iv. The Weil pairing is nondegenerate, which means that if e (P, Q) = 1 for all Q ∈ E[ ], then P = O.
19 P means P + P + P + · · · + P times .
A.1.4 Distortion map and modified Weil pairing
Definition A.1. Let E be an elliptic curve, 3 be a prime, P ∈ E[ ] be a point of order and ψ : E → E be a map from E to itself. Thus, ψ is an − distortion map for P if it has the following properties:
ii. e (P, ψ(P )) r = 1 if and only if |r (i.e, r is a multiple of .).
Proposition A.1.4.1. Let E be the elliptic curve E : y 2 = x 3 + x over F p 2 and suppose that F p 2 has an element α ∈ F p 2 satisfying α 2 = −1. Define a map ψ by ψ(x, y) = (−x, αy) and ψ(O) = O.
ii. The map ψ respects the addition law on E , i.e, ψ(
Proof. See [19] and Section 13.1.6 from [6] .
Definition A.2. Let 3 be a prime, Q and Q be multiples of P ∈ E[ ]. Thus, the modified Weil pairingê on E[ ] is defined byê (Q, Q ) = e (Q, ψ(Q )).
Proposition A.1.4.2. Let E be an elliptic curve, let P ∈ E[ ], let ψ be andistortion map for P , and letê be the modified Weil pairing relative to ψ. Let Q and Q be multiples of P . Then,ê (Q, Q ) = 1 if and only if Q = O or Q = O.
Proof. See [19] .
A.1.5 Isogenies
In short, isogeny-based cryptography utilizes unique algebraic maps between elliptic curves that satisfy group homomorphism. This original idea introduced by [1] 20 detailed a Diffie-Hellman cryptosystem based on the hardness of computing isogenies between ordinary elliptic curves. Nevertheless, [11] developed a quantum algorithm that could compute isogenies between ordinary curves in subexponential time. This algorithm uses the fact that the structure of the elliptical group is commutative. Thus, [15] adapted the isogeny-based key exchange protocol to be based on the difficulty of computing isogenies between supersingular elliptic curves, which does not have commutative endomorphism ring.
Definition A.1. Let E 1 and E 2 be elliptic curves over F p . An isogeny over F p is a morphism φ :
The zero isogeny is the constant map φ : E 1 → E 2 given by φ(P ) = O E2 for all P ∈ E(F p ). If there is an isogeny between two elliptic curves E 1 and E 2 then:
i. E 1 and E 2 are isogenous;
iii. E 1 and E 2 have the same  − invariant if and only if E 1 E 2 overF p (i.e.
exists an isomorfism from E 1 to E 2 ) 21 .
Definition A.2. Let E 1 and E 2 be elliptic curves over F p and φ : E 1 → E 2 over F p . The degree of a non-zero isogeny is the degree of the morphism. The degree of the zero isogeny is 0. If there is an isogeny of degree between elliptic curves E 1 and E 2 then they are -isogenous.
Definition A.3. Let E 1 and E 2 be elliptic curves over F p and φ : E 1 → E 2 an isogeny. Then the kernel of an isogeny is ker(φ) = {P ∈ E 1 (F p ) :
Definition A.4. A non-zero isogeny separable φ : E 1 → E 2 over F p of -degree has #ker(φ) = , i.e, the number of kernel elements equals to . [16] .
Definition A.5. Let φ : E 1 → E 2 andφ : E 2 → E 3 be two isogenies withdegree andˆ -degree, respectively. Then, their composition is an isogenyφ(φ) :
Proposition A.1.5.1. Let E 1 be an elliptic curve over F p and G a finite subgroup of E 1 (F p ) that is defined over F p . Then, there is an unique elliptic curve E G and a separable isogeny φ :
Proof. See Theorem 25.1.6 and Corollary 25.1.7 from [16] .
The Vélu's formula [34] can be used for computing a separable isogeny from an elliptic curve E 1 with given kernel G. Velú showed how to explicitly find the rational function form of a normalized φ : E 1 → E G . The Vélu's formula is presented in next proposition.
Proposition A.1.5.2. Let E(F p ) : y 2 = x 3 + ax + b be an elliptic curve defined over F p , and let G ⊂ E(F p ) be a finite subgroup. The separate isogeny φ : E 1 → E G , of kernel G, can be written as
and the curve E G has equation y 2 = x 3 + a x + b , where
Proof. See [14] .
21 Theorem 9.3.6 from [16] .
Supersingular curves have the property that for every prime = p, there exist + 1 isogenies of degree originating from a given supersingular curve and a common field that includes all isogenous curves in F p 2 [27] . However, it is believed to be hard to determine the isogeny degree. Thus, the security of the cryptosystem from supersingular elliptic curve isogenies is based on this assumption. From now on, in this work, we will consider all the elliptic curves as supersingular over F p 2 .
A.2 Oblivious Transfer protocol
Oblivious Transfer (OT) is a protocol in which a sender transfers one of many pieces of information to a receiver, but remains oblivious as to what piece has been transferred. The original notion of OT was first proposed by Rabin in 1981 [26] in which a sender sends an encrypted message to a receiver and this one could decrypt such message with probability 1/2. After this, [13] presented a general form of OT, named 1-out-of-2 OT, 2 1 -OT for short, i.e, where a sender sends two encrypted messages to a receiver being able to decrypt only one of them. Moreover, many authors have generalized this to n 1 -OT where the receiver chooses one message out of n and k n -OT in which the receiver chooses a subset of size k from among n messages. In this work, we will be focused only on -OT. Therefore, for a merely conceptual and basic view, the OT protocol [5] is presented on appendix C. As can be seen, a sender has two input messages 
B
Linearly independent points and 2 1
-SIOT protocol implementation
In this appendix B, we present definitions for the understanding of the process that determines the choice of linearly independent points P A , Q A , P B and Q B in the proposed protocol.
Definition B.1 (Frobenius). Let E(F q ) be an ellipic curve, and let E(F q k ) be its F q k -rational extension. The Frobenius map is the function Φ : E(F q k ) → E(F q k ) defined by Φ(x, y) = (x q , y q ) for any (x, y) ∈ E(F q k ). Φ i denotes its i-th self-composition, i.e. for any P ∈ E(F q k ), Φ i (P ) := P for i = 0, and -OT protocol.
Definition B.2 (Trace)
. Let E(F q ) be an ellipic curve, and let E(F q k ) be its F q k -rational extension. The trace map is the function tr :
where 1/k denotes the inverse of k mod the order of E(F q k ). In particular, k = 2 for a supersingular curve in characteristic p > 3, and tr(P ) = (1/2)(P + Φ(P )).
Hence, the trace map is important in that its eigenspaces, if nontrivial, form two linearly independent groups that can be used to sample points P A , Q A , P B , Q B efficiently. Moreover, the trace definition assumes that gcd(k, #E(F q k )) = 1, which may not be the case, especially in the important setting where A = 2. Thus, for this scenario we also define the quasi − trace map: Definition B.3 (Quasi-trace). Let E(F q ) be an ellipic curve, and let E(F q k ) be its F q k -rational extension. The quasi-trace map is the function tr :
In particular, k = 2 for a supersingular curve in characteristic p > 3, and tr(P ) = P + Φ(P ). 
C Protocol random

-OT
In this appendix, we see the simplified scheme of the random OT proposed in [5] .
C.1 Premises
1. The scheme from [5] works in a primitive additive group (G, B, F p , +) of prime order p, generated by base point B; 2. The hash function H :
s is used to generate a cryptographic key k i for use in a symmetric cipher defined by the functions E (encryption) and D (decryption); Remark C.1.0.1. Let s be a safety parameter. 
f rom equation (3) = byS + xyB − jT ;
= bT + xyB − jT ; f rom equations (1) and (2)
Therefore, we can conclude that if the Receiver chooses b / ∈ j, it will not share the secret (cryptographic key) with the Sender.
D A possibility of symmetric pairings in the SIOT
Under certain circumstances, it is possible to define a symmetric pairingê : A ).
D.1 Taking symmetric pairings into account
Coupling the above constraints γ = −α 2 /β (mod 
E Validating the process of sharing points (U, V)
Now, we are going to verify the sharing of points U and V between Bob and Alice.. This is important from the point of view of the correct functionality of the SIOT protocol with regard to the oblivious characteristic, i.e, in practical terms, the U and V points provide the sender to generate two secret keys. Thus, Bob will hash a uniformly random bit string w to compute the coefficients α and β, as suggested in Section 3.4. He defines U and V points by means of the algebraic relation U = αG B + βH B and V = −(α/β)U . After that, he sends to Alice one of the pairs (G B , H B ) or (G B − U, H B − V ). Obviously, Alice doesn't distinguish 24 which pair of points she received. Therefore, Alice can map the shared w string applying the same Bob's process. Thus, upon receipt ofĜ B and Ĥ B points from Bob's public key, saypk B = (E B ,Ĝ B ,Ĥ B ), and knowing the algebraic relation above, Alice definesÛ = αĜ B + βĤ B ,V = −(α/β)Û yieldinĝ U = U andV = V . In other words, Alice and Bob have the assurance that U and V points are being correctly shared between the parties.
Proof.
1. In a first assumption, Alice receivesĜ B = (G B − U ) andĤ B = (H B − V ) points from Bob. Evidently, she has not any knowledge about G B and H B points. Thus, she performs the algebraic development below.
IfÛ = U and V = −(α/β)U , thenV = V . Evidently, in this case, IfÛ = U then,V = V .
